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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff/ ) 
Respondent, ) 
) REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. ) 
) Case No. 890332-CA 
ROBERT E. JONES, ) 
) Category 1 
Defendant/ ) 
Appellant. ) 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEDURES 
This is the Reply Brief of Appellant filed pursuant to 
Rule 24(c), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant agrees that the two-prong test set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S. 
Ct. 2052 (1984), addressing the issue of ineffectiveness of 
counsel, applies in this case. Those prongs are, as indicated 
previously: (1) a showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed to 
Defendant by the Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution, and 
that such deficient performance prejudiced the defense, and (2) a 
showing of a reasonable probability that the result of the 
proceeding would have been different but for counsel's 
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unprofessional errors; reasonable probability being defined as 
probability sufficient to undermine the confidence of the 
outcome, Strickland, 466 U.S., at 686; 30 L.Ed.2d, at 692. 
Defendant argues that the standards set forth in 
Str ickland have been met. Points one and two of Appellant1s 
Brief meet the Str ickland test. When combined with the other 
three points, it is apparent that Defendant was not represented 
competently, and that ther«: is at least reasonable probability 
that, but for prior counsel's efforts, the r?sult of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
The balance of Defendant's brief will briefly address 
several issues raised in the Respondent's Brief. 
ISSUES/ARGUMENT 
Issue One 
FAILURE TO MAKE CLAIM AGAINST "CO-COUNSEL", LeROY 
JOHNSON. 
Defendant was granted his Pre-Trial Motion to hire 
Ginger Fletcher by the Trial Court after determination was made 
that there may have been a conflict of interest with the Weber 
County Public Defender attorneys. Ms. Flether was hired by the 
County to represent Defendant at Defendant's request. 
Defendant had no knowledge or input into the hiring of 
LeRoy Johnson, and felt throughout the proceeding that Mr. 
Johnson was simply an assistant no Ms. Fletcher. At no time did 
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he consider LeRoy Johnson to be his attorney. Ms. Fletcher hired 
Mr. Johnson at Johnson1s request to gain experience as an 
attorney by assisting Fletcher in the case. 
Issue Two 
DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCY/MENTAL CONDITION. 
The State, for the most part, takes great license in 
interpreting the testimony of Dr. Alma Carlisle. Defendant urges 
the Court to review the record citations contained in State's 
brief, pages 7 and 8, and compare Dr. Carlisle's actual 
statements with the State's interpretations contained in the 
State's brief. 
Defendant contends that though there is certainly room 
for interpretation, a jury would have been at least concerned and 
at most persuaded that Defendant's mental capacity was lacking 
below the level necessary for conviction of a capital offense. 
Dr. Carlisle testified that: 
"...being a multiple is different from being a whole 
person. And the whole person may decide to commit a 
certain crime and his thought process may be very 
consistent all the way through, from the beginning to 
the end. Thus, there seems to be more responsibility 
for that individual than for a multiple, who is, to a 
degree, out of control." (R., 2718.) 
The State has also attempted to gloss over the fact 
that there was no expert testimony received at either of 
Defendant's trials in this matter. As the State suggests, many 
witnesses testified at his first trial regarding his changing 
personality and extensive history of mental health treatment. 
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(See Appellant's Brief, pp. 30, 31)- However, the State further 
erroneously suggests that because such cestimony failed in the 
first trial, it was reasonable strategy not to raise the issue of 
Defendant's mental health at the second trial. The State forgets 
that in Defendant's first trial there was no expert testimony 
elicited regarding Defendant's diagnosed mental illnesses due to 
the fact that no such diagnoses were made until he was 
incarcerated in Utah State Prison after a guilty verdict from the 
first tr ial . 
Because prior defense counsel Fleccher had the benefit 
of the knowledge of the diagnoses and could have pursued the 
effect of Defendant's mental illness on his actions, as was 
testified to by Dr. Carlisle, her failure to raise such crucial 
issue at trial is simply moie evidence of the unreasonable and 
incompetent manner in which Defendant's defense was conducted. 
Issue Three 
CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF GUN. 
State suggests that the chain of custody of the gun was 
not an element of the crime. Defendant concedes this point, but 
argues that the issue of how the gun got into the basement the 
night Kim Chapman was shot is a crucial issue. If the Defendant 
carried the gun in with him, it is more likely that his 
convictions are just; however, if he did not carry the gun in 
with him, then one or more of the elements of the crime necessary 
for a capital conviction are lacking. 
The State argues that the Defendant's actions of 
purchasing a gun and practicing shooting prior to the occurrences 
leading to the shooting of Kim Chapman, is evidence of his 
preparation for committing of a crime. The State fails to 
further explain that the gun purchased by Defendant from Roger 
Birt and which was used in the shooting practice (R., 2484-2488) 
was not the gun which fired the bullets which killed Kim Chapman. 
(See Appellant's Brief, Addendum Exhibit 2, page 2 and R., 2881-
2886.) According to investigator Vic Gabrenas' report, a .38 
caliber, RG 31 handgun was found in the hills by Defendant's 
attorney on directions from the Defendant, with the serial number 
ground off. After restoration of the serial number by the Weber 
State College Crime Lab Director, James Gaskill, the serial 
number was determined to be Q184020. This gun was tested and 
determined not to be the weapon which killed Kim Chapman. The 
weapon used in the shooting of Chapman had been determined to be 
an RG 40 model .38 caliber handgun, which was also re-tested at 
the time the RG 31 was tested by Mr. Gaskill, whose original 
conclusion was reaffirmed; i.e., that the RG 40 was the weapon 
used in the Chapman shooting. (See page 2 of said Exhibit.) 
The gun which was described as Exhibit 20 throughout 
Defendant's first trial was obtained from a pawn shop known as 
The Gift Shop by Detective Norman Soakai (R., 824-5; see also 
Appellant's Brief, Addendum Exhibit 7, which is a pawn slip used 
to obtain Exhibit 20; see also Appellant's Brief, Addendum 
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Exhibit 8, which is an Affidavit for Search Warrant describing 
Exhibit 20 as an RG .38 special handgun, model 40, serial number 
P139058) . 
Mr. Gaskill testified in the Defendant's first trial 
that Exhibit 20 was the weapon which fired the bullets which 
killed Kim Chapman (R., 743-750). 
The State would have the Court believe that the 
Defendant purchased a gun with the intent of killing Mr. Chapman, 
but because there was more than one gun involved in testimony 
given at the Defendant's trial, the issue of which gun was used 
and where it came from is clearly important in determining 
criminal liability, if any, against the Defendant. Defendant's 
prior counsel ignored these important facts and allowed the State 
to gloss over the dilemma the gun issue would have caused to the 
jury. 
As Defendant has asserted throughout, the gun which 
shot Kim Chapman was not brought to the basement of the Chapman 
residence by the Defendant, but rather was already there when he 
arrived. Defendant argues that Beverly Jones, the State's main 
witness and who was also wounded in the incident, actually 
brought the gun to the basement, and that after the shooting, 
though wounded, was able to hide the gun until it could be 
retrieved and transported back to its owner. (See Appellant's 
Brief, pages 40 and 41.) 
The State, in ics brief, suggests: "...it is unlikely 
Beverly could have retrieved and hidden the gun." (See 
Respondent's Brief, p. 10). Apparently, the State is misled in 
its belief that once the Defendant left the basement of the 
Chapman residence, Earl Chapman, his wife, and the police 
subsequently appeared immediately, thus not allowing time for Ms. 
Jones to hide the weapon. However, as Earl Chapman testified in 
the Defendant's first trial, he walked downstairs, and after an 
initial brief view of the situation, he went back upstairs and 
telephoned the police. In doing so, he initially called the fire 
department and was told to call the police. He then dialed the 
number given to him by the fire department and was asked "to hold 
on for a minute." After making the call, he went to the front 
door and turned on the porch light, where there was an officer 
waiting. (R., 598-600.) It is unknown exactly how much time 
elapsed from the time Mr. Chapman initially viewed the scene in 
the basement after the shooting occurred until the time when he 
and the police officer re-entered the basement. However, several 
minutes would have had to have elapsed for him to have called the 
fire department and then the police department, and then allow 
the police officer into the home and proceed to the basement. 
Such lapse of time would have given Beverly, who was still 
mobile, though wounded (R., 990 and 991), ample time to retrieve 
the weapon and hide it in a manner that it was not discovered. 
Then, at an early opportunity to enlist the help of an accomplice 
to retrieve the weapon and return it to the gun's owner(s). (See 
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further, Appellant's Brief, pp. 18-22 and 39-42-) 
SUMMARY 
Defendant has met his burden to show that his second 
trial did not produce a just result. There are still too many 
loose ends and too much evidence that a trier of fact has not had 
opportunity to review for one to believe that Defendant's trial 
was fair and reliable. A jury with all the tacts before it would 
not have been able to convict Defendant in the way he was 
convicted. The arguments raised by Defendant do create 
reasonable doubt as to the level of crime, if any, that Defendant 
committed. Failing to raise the issues of Defendant's mental 
illness and the ownership/custody of the gun alone is enough to 
demonstrate Attorney Fletcher's deficient performance. 
Certainly, failure to present such evidence, when it exists, is 
prejudice. These points, combined with the others raised in 
Appellant's Brief, resulted in a trial result which is 
unreliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. 687. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments contained in Appellant's Brief 
and the Reply herein to the State's claims, Defendant 
respectfully requests this Court to reverse Defendant's 
conviction and order a new trial. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Y day of August, 1989 
ROBERT L. FROERER 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
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